Implications of the TTIP on the global economic integration of Central and Eastern Europe by Novák, Tamás
  
 
Implications of the TTIP on the Global Economic  
Integration of Central and Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
Tamas Novak 
 
Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. 
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Impact analyses and empirical results of existing studies on the economic im-
pacts of the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) show signifi-
cant benefits for the participating countries. 11 out of the 28 members of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) are from Central Europe (“new” member states) and they are 
mostly small countries with open economies. The impact on less developed 
member states of the Central European region can be double. It can contribute to 
their deeper integration into the global economic networks through investments, 
but their underdevelopment rightly calls for caution. The implications and the 
direction of potential policy responses are even less clear in the rest of Eastern 
Europe. According to some studies, third countries would be facing losses and 
little has been said about the potential impacts on Eastern Europe. Russia, one of 
the largest emerging countries, has formulated very ambitious foreign economic 
and policy objectives. It is trying to restore its economic and political sphere of 
influence. Russia and other countries from the region might forcefully respond to 
possible trade diversion effects and worsening competitiveness if the agreement 
was to contain significant changes.  
 
Introduction 
 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has started integrating into the global markets 
only recently after the breakup of planned economic systems. This region has 
been compared to Latin American countries several times from the early seven-
ties in terms of its international economic integration pattern. Latin-America and 
Eastern Europe shared important macroeconomic characteristics in the final third 
of the twentieth century. In this period, both regions displayed similar economic 
performances, although their economic and political systems were vastly differ-
ent. A common feature of the two regions was that they were at the periphery of 
the international economy and were facing comparable structural challenges 
while international economic developments exerted identical external pressures 
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on them. Economic growth subdued, the terms of trade deteriorated, trade bal-
ances worsened. All these had led to dynamically increasing foreign debt and its 
servicing consumed large parts of the export revenues. Rising indebtedness did 
not serve to speed up structural change (Berend 1994). In both regions the nine-
ties had brought about significant transformation, deep economic changes, and 
renewed efforts to achieve quicker economic growth. On average, Latin America 
and Eastern Europe went through significant transformation, Russia and Brazil 
and other countries have been considered as rapidly growing large emerging 
markets. At the same time, regional integration efforts as well as WTO member-
ship became important drivers of international economic integration for several 
countries in both regions. Despite the remarkable growth performance in interna-
tional comparison and the major advances in catching up with developed coun-
tries, their peripheral/semi peripheral position has not changed significantly. In 
many respects, they are facing the same challenges of globalization, regional in-
tegration, closing the gap and economic sovereignty.   
After the collapse of the planned economic system, most advanced Cen-
tral European countries managed to adopt the key institutions of a market econ-
omy and liberal democracy. The European Union has become the most important 
trading partner for all of them, but policy orientations, economic growth and 
democratic transformation showed big differences across the region. Today, there 
are two fundamentally different and distinct country groups in Eastern Europe. 
The first group consists of countries that have either become members of the Eu-
ropean Union, or were intending to enter the EU and are already negotiating 
membership. Some other countries in this group have association agreements 
with the EU.
1
 These countries have chosen the path of global integration through 
integration into a large single market by giving up several instruments of their 
external economic policy. The other group mostly comprises countries that do 
not possess a realistic perspective of EU membership, or nations that do not in-
tend to join at all (Novak 2014: 1).
2
  
EU member Central European countries may be viewed as a broadly co-
herent group that shares similar interests although their economic and political 
strategies may vary from time to time. Russia, after more than a decade long de-
cline, is the largest emerging economic and political power in Eastern Europe 
today, and has a clear intention to shape the future of the region. This country is 
gaining more and more importance in the Eurasian space and pursues a dissimilar 
strategy to what is followed by the EU members. In recent years Russia has initi-
ated an ambitious integration project with the final objective of creating a Eura-
                                                
1
 In the region, negotiations are currently underway with Serbia and Montenegro. Candi-
date or potential candidate countries are Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Alba-
nia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.  
2
 The European Union has its Eastern Partnership (EAP) policy aimed at creating deep 
free trade with post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine.  
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sian Economic Union.
3
 In addition, it has also sought to expand its influence 
westwards by using its natural resources and capital investments. 
  
Impacts of the TTIP and Economic Theories 
 
Advantages of this agreement are supposed to be similar to those that were fore-
cast before the creation of the European Single Market (SM). The internal market 
in a simple form is based on the neo-classical approach: eliminating trade and 
investment barriers = increasing trade and investment activity because of bigger 
expected returns, efficient labor market, etc. These advantages are supposed to 
come from eliminating the distortions of competition. In theory, consumers in 
each country gain from lower prices and any losses to the local producers will be 
more than compensated by the gains from greater competition. Increased compe-
tition and enlarged market opportunities stimulate the development and use of 
new technologies that improve productivity, decrease costs, increase living 
standards, etc. By doing so economic growth rates will be higher and new jobs 
will be created (Vetter 2013: 4).  
This strong belief in market forces and the positive sum game of liberali-
zation for each participant seems to be a bit strange at first sight soon after an 
economic crisis when more cautious approaches of economic thinking are on the 
rise. The benefits of market forces and external liberalization have been ques-
tioned weakening the unconditional mainstream belief in them.
4
 As far as the 
benefits of single market type integration are concerned, we may argue from the 
opposite perspective as well in terms of costs: the single market idea involves 
channeling the negative implications of globalization, including (1) loss of jobs, 
because of increased competition; (2) disappearing industries because of weaker, 
smaller domestic economic actors; (3) negative impact on structurally weak re-
gions. This last impact was expected to be eased by regional and structural poli-
cies, though these are seemingly without success as reflected in intensifying re-
gional differences within the EU.  
The objective of the EU Single Market was to deliver higher growth rates 
to keep up the pace and successfully compete with fast growing emerging re-
gions. Its impacts are not entirely about success and assessments are only super-
ficially addressing these problems (Straathof et al. 2008; Boltho, Eichengreen 
2008; Copenhagen Economics 2012). Even if there are arguments to support that 
the current problems of the EU have not all been caused by the operation of the 
                                                
3
 The EurAsEC Customs Union became increasingly important for Russia since the 
launch of EAP. Its members: Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus. Armenia and Kirgizstan is 
expected to join the Union soon. 
4
 As Joseph Stieglitz writes: “Neo-liberal market fundamentalism was always a political 
doctrine serving certain interests. It was never supported by economic theory. Nor, it 
should now be clear, is it supported by historical experience. Learning this lesson may be 
the silver lining in the cloud now hanging over the global economy.” accessed at: 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-end-of-neo-liberalism- 
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SM, several politicians and the public perceive the SM as a failure.
5
 During the 
past two decades, in relative terms, in comparison with the rest of the world, the 
EU’s economic performance has deteriorated, which may suggest that the prima-
ry objective of the SM has not been fulfilled. It is clear that all of the ex-ante as-
sessments were unrealistically optimistic about the positive impacts of the Single 
Market (Cecchini, Catinat, Jacquemin 1988)
6
 and were unable to properly ad-
dress the negative impacts the less developed members would face.   
Impact assessments to date generally show that each country participat-
ing in the TTIP gets benefits; the only question left to answer is the extent of 
such benefits as they may vary from country to country and be largely a function 
of the content of the agreement (CEPR 2013; Felbermayr, Heid, Lehwald 2013; 
Felbermayr, Larch 2013). If problem areas (agriculture, culture, etc.) were taken 
out of the deal, most of the benefits could not be felt and the advantages would 
be significantly lower (CEPR 2013: 2). Disregarding the fact that none of the 
impact assessments is capable of grasping the implications entirely, and even less 
able to calculate with unexpected political and economic changes, not to mention 
unpredictability of the reactions of third countries, the case of the EU internal 
market – and experiences of other FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) – prove that 
less developed countries may loose with the liberalization and the opening up of 
markets. The case of Greece and other southern countries of the EU clearly prove 
that problems with FTAs and other integration initiatives can be numerous. Less 
developed countries of the European Union, or those that are not competitive 
enough, would not gain as much as is forecasted; what is more, the risk of losing 
is not negligible, especially if inappropriate economic policies are pursued. The 
prospect of gaining less or even sustaining losses by underdeveloped countries is 
in line with economic theories that do not believe in positive sum impacts of in-
ternational economic liberalization.
7
 
                                                
5
 According to Commission calculations, between 1992 and 2008 an additional 2.13% 
GDP growth and 2.77 million jobs were created (European Commission 2012). It would 
be interesting to see how much more jobs and GDP was lost because of the deep integra-
tion among the countries. “The Single Market (...) is less popular than ever, while Europe 
needs it more than ever.... The Single Market is seen as ‘yesterday’s business’ compared 
to other policy priorities.” (Monti 2010: 6) 
6
 The Cecchini Report calculated a potential wealth effect of 4.25-6.5% of GDP for the 
twelve member states in the Single Market. None of the ex-post assessments proves more 
than 2 percent, and “…an economic assessment of the Single Market…brings with it the 
conceptual difficulty of separating the impact of the Single Market not only from the con-
sequences of globalization, but also from the introduction of the euro.” (Vetter 2013: 3) 
7
 This strategy proved successful for example in the US and Germany (when they were 
less developed than their trading partners), and much later in some of the emerging far 
Eastern regions. “In the first stage they must adopt free trade with the more advanced na-
tions as a means of raising themselves from a state of barbarism and of making advances 
in agriculture. In the second stage they must resort to commercial restrictions to promote 
the growth of manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade. In the last stage, af-
ter reaching the highest degree of wealth and power, they must gradually revert to the 
principle of free trade and of unrestricted competition in the home as well as in foreign 
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EU Members from CEE 
 
The potential benefits of small, open economies that deeply integrated into the 
international division of labor, such as the “new EU members” that joined the EU 
in 2004, 2007, and 2013 are believed to be significant. Some of them have export 
openness indicators above the 75-80% range (export/GDP) and their import ac-
tivities are also significant because of the high import intensity of their export 
production. This integration into the international division of labor and openness 
to trade explains why the calculations on the effects of TTIP indicate above aver-
age benefits for them. Apparently, they are interested in liberalization and trade 
facilitation that helps to further expand their exports. Increasing foreign sales are 
essentially important for their sustainable growth. Because of the small domestic 
market and the limited local purchasing power, if firms in these countries aim at 
increasing sales and creating more jobs, they simply have no alternatives to in-
ternationalization. Their exports are mostly based on the performance of FDI-
related manufacturing and services firms, and they need to elaborate strategies 
that preserve and strengthen export orientation. (This should not mean the negli-
gence of domestic demand factors – consumption and investment – but their pri-
mary role is to balance the growth pattern, rather than replace export orientation 
with domestic demand driven strategy, at least at the current level of economic 
development). The success of export-led growth strategy depends on several fac-
tors and there are a number of risks and challenges of such a strategy as well (In-
otai 2013: 5). But the countries that implement strategies which attempt to disre-
gard export orientation will soon face sustainability problems. 
Because Central European countries cannot compete with really low 
wage countries from the Far East (though their wages are still low in internation-
al comparison), long-term sustainable strategies cannot avoid upgrading techno-
logical capabilities by attracting more FDI. If the conditions of doing business 
are improved, the rule of law is upheld, productivity is increased, they could 
count on increasing investment from US firms already before the TTIP enters 
into force (Hamilton 2013: 308). Increased FDI from US production and services 
firms is the most important source of possible benefit of the TTIP in the Central 
European member states. The realistic and sustainable economic strategy of these 
countries should focus on the further modernization of their export structure and 
the upgrading of technology. This, however, would require large investments in 
human and physical infrastructure and the improvement of the business environ-
ment. If these conditions are fulfilled, theoretically, TTIP would again open a 
window of opportunity for several countries to utilize the agreement for the pur-
pose of accelerating economic growth.  
An additional benefit may be related to investments made by third coun-
tries. Participation in integration initiatives influences transaction costs for third 
                                                                                                                     
markets, so that their agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants may be preserved from 
indolence and stimulated to retain the supremacy which they have acquired.” (List 1916: 
XX) 
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countries that raise the question of production within the integration area or ex-
port there. Integration initiatives (even in their simplest form, i.e. free trade area) 
are creating incentives for third countries to invest within integrated areas in or-
der to avoid trade-related costs. Theoretically, they can encourage firms – that 
may eventually want to export to the USA – to invest in Central Europe 
(Hamilton, Quinlan 2013: VI). An investment boom of this kind was evident pri-
or to the EU accession of the Central European countries. The impact of FDI was 
largely tangible before the accession took place, not least because of the extra-
EU investments (Bevan, Estrin 2004: 777). The volume of such investments 
would not be too large, but it is potentially reckoned with.  
On the other hand, however, the risk of smaller than expected impacts is 
high, which makes the picture for “new members” and other peripheral EU coun-
tries a little more obscure (CEED 2013: 5). The problem is that in several coun-
tries the economy has a dual structure; a few large transnational firms are inte-
grated into the international production chains, while the rest of the economy is 
unable to participate in international trade, because it lacks exportable, competi-
tive products. In addition, not least because of the internal problems of the Euro-
pean Union and the increasing Russian influence in the region, the regional polit-
ical commitment to liberal economic order and democracy is not at all guaran-
teed. And this is an increasingly serious issue in a region, where economic and 
political transformation was thought to firmly integrate countries into the system 
of western institutions and values. The changes in political and economic policy 
strategies may increase business risks in certain countries. All factors taken into 
consideration, benefits for the less developed Central European countries in 
terms of export, FDI and GDP growth is probably larger than the disadvantages 
(CEPA 2013: 6). It is explained by their pattern of division of labor that is based 
on export orientation of foreign owned firms. All these favorable impacts, how-
ever, can be utilized only if the business environment is favorable enough. There 
is, however a substantial risk that policies in the region may become inward look-
ing and more protectionist. This risk is strengthened by the weak performance of 
the European economy and the unfulfilled expectations of the EU membership in 
terms of catching up.  
The choice of economic and political models of Central European gov-
ernments may be influenced by the economic performance of advanced and 
emerging countries. There is a danger that regional governments and politicians 
see the EU as a weak economic center whose economic and political model is 
inadequate to respond to current and future global challenges. The increasing 
skepticism may lead to the conclusion that, instead of the European model, they 
should follow potentially more successful strategies. Anti-EU economic and po-
litical strategies in the countries shattered by economic difficulties, characterized 
by relatively poor economic outlook, and declining standards of living, however, 
are on the increase. Developments over the past few years could easily lead to the 
introduction of measures that are shockingly different from European traditions 
and that would probably weaken the ties that have developed over the past more 
than two decades. Economic integration can be considered “too deep” because 
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the original objective of economic and political transformation has not been 
achieved
8
 and, instead of convergence on the living standards of more developed 
countries, a more complicated balance has been experienced. The situation could 
easily worsen. Tempted by the almost unlimited power of leaders in some post-
Soviet countries, democratic systems could morph into something “new”, into 
very destructive, obsolete structures in which country identity is defined in oppo-
sition to the European development model. If that happens, the possible favorable 
implications of TTIP will not be felt in the affected countries. 
 
Russia 
 
The original idea that the TTIP agreement can be beneficial for each country in 
the long run relies on the presumption that “the economic importance of the EU 
and the US will mean that their partners will also have an incentive to move to-
wards the new transatlantic standards” (European Commission 2013). In other 
worlds, third countries would face such immense losses that it would be their 
very interest to join the TTIP. This is an overly optimistic forecast of the pro-
spective developments. Turning to the third countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, the key question is Russia, which would definitely take the TTIP for what it 
really means for this country – a geopolitical aspiration that may threaten Rus-
sia’s positions in Europe. The important political objective behind the TTIP is 
that this large-scale bilateral agreement increases the incentives of third parties to 
achieve further liberalization steps at the multilateral level. This way the TTIP 
(the advanced countries) becomes a rule setter in international trade for third 
countries. It would lead the EU and the USA to regain a leading position in inter-
national trade and economic development. This expectation is realistic only if 
third countries feel that it is in their interest to accept the rules elaborated by de-
veloped economies. This situation would be similar to the decades preceding the 
economic rise of large emerging countries, when developing or less developed 
countries were not able to defend their interests against the advanced countries in 
international economic organizations. This is also the fundamental issue concern-
ing countries such as China, Russia, India and Brazil or other large emerging 
markets.  
None of the scenarios in the existing analyses calculate openly with po-
tential counter steps taken by third countries. A more realistic approach is to 
count with three scenarios: (1) large emerging countries may think that they will 
not lose too much if the agreement finally remains limited in scope; (2) the TTIP 
may be a strong incentive for new agreements and instruments within the frame-
work of WTO negotiations with the objective of reducing the negative implica-
tions; (3) third countries will increasingly look for countermeasures. The first two 
alternatives are clearly far more beneficial for the advanced world. Regarding the 
third choice, this would result in the intensification of creating trade blocks (that 
                                                
8
 The argument of too deep integration is not only a way of thinking of Central Europe, 
but similar dilemmas are worded in more developed EU members too. 
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may lead to the increasing disruption of global trade) and/or instruments which 
make export and investment from advanced countries more difficult. In addition, 
more concerted efforts and steps from large emerging countries cannot be ruled 
out if international economic relations are aggravated. Closer cooperation be-
tween large emerging countries regarding international trade would suffice to 
establish a common ground for asserting similar interests. Should that eventuate, 
it will probably disrupt global trade and its currently existing institutional system. 
Russia has been able to strengthen its position in international relations 
and become strong enough to try to regain and increase its influence in some 
parts of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). Russia’s efforts to rein-
tegrate a part of the CIS will continue and strengthen as a number one priority in 
its foreign policy. Regarding economic issues, Russia is becoming an increasing-
ly important player in the eastern part of Europe and in Asia (Berman 2013). In 
recent years, the country has become one of the most important capital investors 
in the world, mostly through state-owned enterprises, though obviously not inde-
pendently from politics, and it has become the number one investor in the East 
European region (UNCTAD 2013: 8; 13). In the coming years its efforts to be 
involved in European business will most likely further strengthen. In addition to 
achieving economic penetration, it is also more and more in its interest to stop 
the spread of Western-style democracy, perhaps even in countries where it 
seemed to be solidly rooted.
 9
 
In addition to geopolitical considerations, the most important issue for 
Russia relates to the energy sector. If TTIP eases access to US gas, it will benefit 
both European consumers and the industry. (On the other hand, the cheap gas 
exports to Europe would erode the competitive advantage of US firms over Eu-
ropean competitors.) At the same time, this new source of natural gas would sub-
stantially diminish the Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, which is disadvan-
tageous to Russia from macroeconomic and geopolitical perspectives. As Euro-
pean demand decreases, Russia will be increasingly forced to reorient its energy 
exports to other markets, and gain influence mostly through investments in the 
European energy and financial sectors. There are clear signs that Russia seeks to 
put its hand on as much European assets as possible. The biggest opportunity for 
Russia to do that is in the Central European region with which it can partly sub-
stitute its losses in natural gas exports provided that US gas is imported more 
easily. In addition, Russia can restrict its imports from Europe in response, since 
this country uses trade policy as a political tool, despite its recent WTO member-
ship. If Russia considers that its loss is too big in Europe and it is not possible to 
regain a share of it in other parts of the globe, then it can use its imports from 
Europe as a bargaining power.  
                                                
9
 See for example the citation from an interview with Francis Fukuyama: “I think that's 
right, that Russia doesn't have an interest in having a healthy democracy on its borders 
because that's going to give the wrong signals to its own people. So I think it's probably 
right that Russia would prefer to have other authoritarian neighbors around it.” (Fukuya-
ma 2013)   
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To sum up, energy is a sensitive issue for the Russian economy and the 
danger of worsening Russian positions in the European market may cause Russia 
to control as many countries as it is possible through oil, gas, nuclear power gen-
eration or financial sector investments. The TTIP could be an important element 
in the changes of the global energy landscape. After the conclusion of the TTIP, 
sooner or later US natural gas exports will definitely and significantly increase. It 
could have serious geopolitical implications for Europe’s own relationship with 
Russia. 
Table 1 
Geographical pattern of Russian merchandise trade 
(% of total export or import) 
 
 Export  Import 
 2005 2012  2005 2012 
Total 100.00 100.00 Total 100.00 100.00 
EU 53.63 48.96 EU 42.79 40.34 
Germany    8.17 6.79 Germany    13.45 12.11 
Netherlands 10.19 14.63 Italy 4.47 4.24 
Italy 7.89 6.18 France 3.72 4.36 
CEE6* 10.59 8,41 CEE6* 5.91 6.98 
CIS 13.51 14.94 CIS 19.24 13.77 
China 5.40 6.81 China 7,36 16,39 
USA 2.62 2.47 USA 4,62 4,85 
Rest of the 
World 
24.84 26.82 Rest of the 
World 
25.99 24.65 
Source: Own calculation, Central Bank of Russia 
*Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania 
 
Table 2 
Russia’ trade with the EU by SITC section 2012 (% of total export or import) 
 
  Export Import 
0 Food and live animals 0.6 6.7 
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.0 1.3 
2 Crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels 
0.9 1.4 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials 
76.3 1.1 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes 
0.2 0.4 
5 Chemicals and related products, 
n.e.c 
3.0 15.8 
6 Manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material 
6.4 10.3 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 0.9 49.6 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.2 11.9 
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c 2.8 0.8 
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade 
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Conclusion 
 
Impacts of the TTIP on Central and Eastern Europe depend on the details of the 
final agreement. There are three scenarios; each has very different implications 
both for members and third countries.  
(1) Since the aim of the TTIP is political, the discussion will concentrate 
on regulations and standards (trade, consumer safety, environment, etc.), but be-
cause of the conflicts between the EU and the US concerning the underlying 
principles, without achieving sizeable results.  
(2) The TTIP breaks away with international trade because it leads to 
new standards that are protectionist against third countries such as China, India, 
Russia, etc. Global trade becomes fragmented with intensifying role of regional 
blocks.  
(3) The third alternative is an open TTIP that encourages third countries 
to join. As a result, the TTIP would become the core of a new global trading sys-
tem where the rule setters are once again the most advanced economies. 
It is impossible to see today which of these alternatives will become a re-
ality. If it develops into a deep, comprehensive agreement, the impacts will be far 
bigger. In this case Central European member countries of the EU would theoret-
ically gain a lot due to their integration into the division of labor mostly through 
transnational firms at different levels of their supplier chain. Had the govern-
ments of these countries pursued outward looking economic policies and im-
proved business environment, this would attract additional foreign direct invest-
ments from mostly US firms, but an increase in investment from third countries 
can also not be ruled out entirely. However, the risk of inward looking policies in 
this region is intensifying, which would render the utilization of opportunities 
even more difficult. 
Regarding third countries from the region, the strategy Russia chooses to 
adopt seems to be the most important. The negative implications of a deep TTIP 
would be intense. The first impact would be related to trade diversion in the short 
run. The long term implication is, however, much more serious and relates to 
Russian energy exports that make up around 75% of Russian sales to the EU. As 
the TTIP would improve the market access of US energy to Europe, Russian en-
ergy exports would be seriously hit. To counterbalance these negative implica-
tions, in addition to export reorientation towards other countries, this country 
may want to increase its influence in other sectors through investments into Eu-
ropean assets. In an extreme case, the TTIP may trigger stronger cooperation 
among large emerging countries to formulate concerted efforts to neutralize 
negative consequences of the agreement. 
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